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China’s Good Earth:
From Urbanization to Rural Development
under Hu Jintao’s Administration

Jessica Wade
Abstract
This paper analyzes the recent efforts of the Chinese government to
facilitate rural development. It reviews the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP)’s previous emphasis on urban-based growth, the
history behind the shift towards rural development, and the
attempts by President Hu Jintao to move from extensive urban
development towards sustainable rural development. It asserts,
first, that much of China’s urban-based development was
intentionally encouraged by the government, and second, that the
CCP is now deliberately moving its investment and focus to
rural-based growth. The paper justifies these findings through an
exploration of the previous and current economic policies and
propaganda of the CCP. This study also explores the logic behind
the policy changes and the implications of the new rural
development policies, combining the primary and secondary
resources with fieldwork undertaken in Sichuan province. The
findings help us better understand how the previous government
policies have shaped China’s dualistic development and how
China’s economic landscape may be drastically transformed within
the decade.
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China’s Good Earth:
From Urbanization to Rural Development
under Hu Jintao’s Administration
Jessica Wade

Introduction
Since the inauguration of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen
Jiabao in March 2003, rural development has quickly snaked its
way to the top of the Chinese government’s agenda. By March
2005 Premier Wen had pledged that agriculture, farmers and the
rural areas would constitute “top priority of all [the] work” of
central government. (The People’s Daily Online, 10 March 2005) The
Number One Documents of both 2004 and 2005 also made rural
welfare a top priority for the government. (Lu 2005: 392) Hu and
Wen’s slogan of “Establishing the New Socialist Countryside”
(Jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun), unveiled in 2005, clarifies rural
development as the leading goal for China in the twentieth-first
century. This slogan represents a deliberate effort to reverse
urbanization as both a phenomenon and an unarticulated
development strategy of the previous administrations. Chen
Xiwen, deputy director of the Office of Central Financial Work
Leading Group, succinctly captured the logic of this reversal in
1
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policy: “Are we to continue relying on the rural masses for
industrialization and urbanization? …The urban and industrial
economy will now work to drive the countryside forward.”
(Bloomberg.com, 3 March 2006)

Hu and Wen have numerous reasons for reversing the
previous policy of urbanization. First, urbanization has become a
major social, political, and economic concern. Second, economic
growth has been so chaotic that the government began trying to
curb its growth in 2006. An emphasis on rural development can be
seen as part of this effort to redirect investment and growth to the
poorer regions. Third, environmental concerns make the current
development pattern unsustainable and necessitate new strategies.
Fourth, international media and Chinese intellectuals have called
for the government to balance development; these criticisms
threaten Hu’s legitimacy as China’s new leader. Fifth, and perhaps
most importantly, the urban-rural gap has become so noticeable
that it has sparked massive protests over the last few years.
Protests in 2005 reached an official count of 87,000, with an
increase of 10,000 over 2004. (Bloomberg.com, 3 March 2006) Chen
Guidi and Wu Chuntao’s controversial work, Zhongguo nongmin
diaocha (A Survey of Chinese Peasants), published in 2003, portrayed
the sufferings of Chinese farmers during a time of plenty, igniting
more outrage across the country. In response to the growing
criticism, the government has been increasing its investment in the
rural areas and agricultural sector.

2
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This study combines the Chinese official publications on
rural development with fieldwork materials, which were collected
in Sichuan Province in July 2006. The field work was undertaken
through the assistance of Heifer Project International China (Guoji
Xiaomuniu Xiangmu). During the fieldwork, I interviewed Chinese
farmers and local officials who participated in Heifer’s livestockraising programs. The interviews were conducted in two counties.
Nanbu County, five hours’ drive northeast of Chengdu, is one of
China’s designated poor counties; the Heifer programs there
involve rabbit and pig raising projects. Dayi County, an hour’s
drive west of Chengdu, implements Heifer’s rabbit raising projects.
Interviews focused on the planning, monitoring, and evaluation
needs of Heifer Project International China. Although the
experience in these two counties only represent a small fraction of
the overall picture, the knowledge and insights gained from
fieldwork highlight the complexities of rural development at the
grassroots level.

This paper first examines the history of urbanization in
China, the role of urbanization in Chinese development, and the
government’s role in encouraging urbanization. In particular, it
discusses the current efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to
shift from urbanization to sustainable rural development. It draws
on the interviews conducted in the countryside in July 2006 to
evaluate the government’s policies of rural development, its
implementation, and the reactions of Chinese farmers. This study
then addresses the question of whether the new emphasis on rural
3
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development represents a re-orientation of the Communist
government policy of modernization. It concludes by analyzing
the implications of the rural development strategies in twentiethfirst-century China.

The Height of Urbanization Strategy
Urbanization in China differs from urbanization in the developed
and developing world. Its main features include the intentional
urbanization of small towns rather than major cities, the growth of
floating migration rather than permanent urban migration, the
constraints on rural-to-urban migration imposed by the hukou
(household) registration system, and the rapid growth of urban
development at the expense of rural welfare.

The Chinese term of urbanization, chengshihua or dushihua,
refers to an increasing concentration of the national population in
cities and towns. (Demography Dictionary 1986: 367) As Shi Yilong
further points out, “[Urbanization] refers to the process of the
agricultural population becoming a non-agricultural population as
it concentrates in the cities.” (Shi 1997: 123) Gregory Eliyu Guldin
notes that the State Statistical Bureau recorded an increase in the
urban population from 20.8% in 1982 to 36.6% in 1988, and then to
49.6% by the end of 1988. (State Statistical Bureau 1989: 87, in
Guldin 1992: 3) Other official figures cite the urban population rate
as increasing from 19.39% in 1980 to 37.66% in 2001. (China
Statistical Yearbook 2002: 21, in Chen 2004: 1) These conflicting
4
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figures are affected by the different definitions of a township and
by the presence of agricultural and floating migrant populations
living within these urban areas. Nonetheless they exemplify the
rapid growth of urbanization.

The phenomena of Chinese urbanization cannot be explained
simply through a growth of city populations but is further
distinguished in several specific ways. First, much of the
“urbanization” taking place occurs as rural people move within
their counties to small towns such as the county seat, rather than
small or major cities. (See Figure 1) This pattern directly
contradicts the conventional patterns of urbanization in other
developing countries, where rural populations tend to migrate to
the capital or to a megalopolis such as Lagos and Mexico City.
(ISTED 2005: 7) This development directly stems from the state’s
policies. In the new economic reform policies released in
December 1978 and October 1984, the Chinese government created
an urban distribution policy that promoted small towns and rural
industrialization as a means to achieve its development goals.
“The distribution policy called for limited development in all large
metropolitan areas, the selective development of only a few
medium-sized cities, more development in small cities, but most
development in rural towns and villages. Rural-urbanization or
‘urbanizing the countryside’ continue[d] as slogans for urban
development.” (Chang et al 1990: 140) This policy has been
credited with preventing even more chaotic migration to major

5
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cities

such

as

Beijing

and

Shanghai,

which

have

been

overpopulated for centuries.

Second,

Chinese

urbanization

is

overwhelmingly

characterized by the movement of rural population to towns and
cities for a season or for a few years before returning home, thus
never severing the social and economic ties with their home village.
Many of these temporary migrants form regional and kinshipbased communities in the city, extending the reach of their village
into the city, and increasing the influence of the city back in the
countryside. Figure 2 shows the growth of the inter-county
“floating population” (liudong renkou) since 1982. The period from
1995 to 2000 saw the growth of a floating population almost 3
times higher than the created permanent migrant populations, at
59 million versus 20 million. (Liang et al 2004: 473) The size of this
floating population accounted for 6 per cent of the country’s total
population in 2000. (ibid) China’s floating population and its
extensive linkages between rural and urban areas have become an
integral part of the contemporary Chinese social landscape.

Third, Shi Yilong (1997) draws attention to a major tension in
China’s urbanization: the natural “pull” of cities (due to more
abundant employment opportunities) and the “push” of rural
areas (through labour surpluses) cause a greater flow to the cities
than what can be accommodated by the Chinese urban planning
policies and household registration system. The government has in
many ways prevented a great deal of urbanization through the
6
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hukou restrictions, which prohibit those who leave their hometown
without permission from receiving any benefits granted to
“legitimate” urban residents. If the government did not have the
hukou system in place, rural-urban migration would arguably be
much greater than it is today. However, the restricted level of
urbanization is nonetheless having a vast impact on the economy,
increasing growth while leading to inequality and rural discontent.
A corollary effect of the hukou policy is that rural areas are under
great pressure to provide new non-agricultural work opportunities
to employ relatively immobile surplus labour and to prevent this
population from moving to the cities illegally. The inadequacy of
the urban areas to absorb migrants and the rigid settlement system
in place actually make urbanization all the more apparent, despite
their statistically lower levels relative to other countries.

Indeed, China’s rate of urbanization is well below average.
“The urban population as a percentage of the total population on
average is 78 for high income OECD countries but is only 31 for
low income countries.” (World Bank 2001, in Chang 2004: 168)
While figures on China’s urban population vary from 32% to 49%,
it is still far below the World Bank’s calculation of an
industrialized nation’s average urban population. Gene H. Chang
states that “China lags behind the world standard in urbanization,
even

during

its

rapid

economic

growth

period

under

reform. …Urgent attention and effective policies are needed to
accelerate urbanization.” (Chang 2004: 167) This claim rests on the
ability of urban populations to drive industrialization and, thus,
7

Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.1
development. The claim takes theoretical models such as the Lewis
dual-sector model and Kuznets Curve theories as universal models
for development.

The appeals for China to improve its cities to absorb more
rural migrants and to dismantle the hukou system both have merit.
However, Chang’s petition for China to increase urbanization in
order to develop more rapidly confuses causality with correlation;
“development” as an end result cannot necessarily be achieved
through further urbanization, which would only increase the
uneven development and inefficiencies as we see today.
Furthermore, the Western capitalistic model of industrialization
simply cannot withstand the extremely complicated realities faced
by the Chinese government. Claiming that the state should
actively promote urbanization overlooks many problems including
the social tension created by such rapid urbanization, the economic
inefficiencies

of

drastically

uneven

development,

the

environmental disasters, and the logical inadequacy of the Kuznets
model, which claims that once all surplus labour is absorbed,
national income equality will increase. (Lu 2004) “The Kuznets
Curve…predicts that [inequality] should decline as more people
move out of agriculture into the industrial sector. But since every
seventh person on this planet works in Chinese agriculture, there
are a lot of people left to move.” (Piech 2004) Simply put, the
direction of Chinese development and urbanization must not rely
too completely on global comparative studies of urbanization, but
rather on Chinese realities.
8
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The Chinese pattern of urbanization is perhaps most
fundamentally

distinguished

by

the

greater

government

investment and more rapidly increasing wage in the cities as
compared to rural areas. Mao and his successors have invested
tremendously in industrialization (which requires cheap workers),
urban infrastructure (to facilitate industrial development and
trade), and urban housing and food distribution. The wage gap in
urban and rural areas represents an increasingly problematic and
contentious issue in China. According to Gu Hongbin, “The share
of the rural population in total consumption has fallen from
around 60% in the early 1980s to just 42% in 2001, while the share
of the rural population in China’s total population still stands at
65%.” (Gu Hongbin 2002, in Nolan 2004: 13) Gerhard K. Heilig
argues that China’s Gini index (its measure of inequality) stands at
0.447, which is highly uneven; the fact this level of inequality has
essentially developed only since 1978 makes the contrast even
more staggering. (See Figure 3) (Heilig 2006: 147) The “wage” gap
is not merely about purchasing power and wages, however:
“Urban residents earn about 3.22 times as much as their rural
counterparts, according to official figures. But experts estimate that
if the non-salary benefits of urban residents are taken into
consideration, the gap could be up to six times.” (The China Daily,
13 June 2006) Essentially, almost all of China’s economic
development in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries
has taken place in the cities.

9
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In the final analysis, three parallel processes of Chinese
“urbanization” can be discerned: first, demographically, more
rural people are moving out of the countryside and urban
populations are increasing relative to rural populations. Second,
sociologically, rural populations seem to be acquiring more urban
ways of life through increased integration with cities and an
increasing exposure to non-agricultural employment opportunities.
Third, and most importantly for this analysis, “urbanization”
describes the increasing prosperity and importance of urban areas
in terms of their development. All these processes result from the
previous government policies. Regarding uncontrolled causes of
urbanization, China, like any other developing nation, has
endured the systemic problems of comparatively poor rural access
to healthcare, education, and perhaps most importantly, profitmaking. Seasonal setbacks such as flood and drought intensified
rural vulnerability. Due to centuries of overpopulation, China has
also had a long-established rural labour surplus, making it
unnecessary and illogical for all the farmers to remain in the
countryside. Thus there has always been a trend for migration to
the cities. The Communist authorities have greatly slowed down
this process of rural-to-urban migration by introducing the
household registration system. Chan Kam Wing points out that
this restriction was introduced and maintained because the
government prioritized industrial growth over consumption, and
therefore was unwilling to spend a great deal of money on
urbanization costs such as universal housing and welfare for the
growing industrial labour force. (Chan 1992: 60)
10
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Urban Development as Urbanization
Ironically, by 2003 the Communist Party was both at its height of
urbanization strategies while preventing urbanization more than
any

Chinese

administration

or

imperial

dynasty.

This

contradiction is due to greater urban investment at the expense of
rural welfare. The increasing prosperity of the cities creates an
even greater sense of urbanization. Because there is so much
improvement in urban areas, the desire of rural people to migrate
is greater; this has further enforced the need for the household
registration system as a means of social control and the lack of
assistance for the so-called “illegal” migrants in order to
discourage their migration. Consequently, the migrants end up
living in a chaotic condition with no access to education,
healthcare, decent wages, housing, pensions and unemployment
benefits.

The government has, since the Han period (206 BC—AD 220),
built up its cities not only as trading centres but also as
administrative powers. Since 1949 in particular, the Communist
state has sought to rapidly industrialize in order to become a
world superpower. (Pannell 1992: 12, 24) The government has also
actively invested and sought private investment for trade,
including ports and factories, as well as higher-priced shopping
and housing developments in cities. Despite the rhetoric of “deurbanism” and “anti-urbanism” designed to close the gap between
the rural and urban sectors, the most efficient industrialization

11
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during economic reform took place in urban areas. (Kwok 1992: 67,
citing Kirkby 1985:1-18)

Thus urbanization as a process of development, in which
urban areas are being actively developed by the Chinese
government to the detriment of rural populations, has been
enforced by a number of policies. “Yang (1999) attributed the rise
in urban-rural disparity after 1985 to what he called ‘urban-biased
policy mix’, including increased urban subsidies, investments, and
banking credits, which have affected higher inflationary taxes on
rural earnings.” (Lu 2004: 256) Meanwhile, D. G. Johnson points to
three major policy areas that have affected rural incomes:
restrictions on rural to urban migration, the inaccessibility of
education in rural areas, and the urban-biased allocation of
investment and credit. (Johnson 2000) Several specific policies,
which have benefited urban workers and harmed rural-born
citizens, are outlined here.

First, urban residents receive far better social welfare than
rural residents. Urban benefits not only include access to
healthcare and education; “universal work participation and
residence were the key social inclusion and welfare entitlement
factors.” Meanwhile, “the state has never been directly involved in
rural welfare affairs carried out by the communes and brigades
and only intervened in residual relief work.” (Hebel 2004: 224) The
growing welfare gap is not simply a result of an improvement in
urban welfare; rural welfare has in many cases degenerated. “It is
12
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widely agreed that the relatively equal access to healthcare that
existed before the reform has been eroded by decentralization and
deregulation and inequality increased at the regional and
household levels.” (Bloom and Wilkes 1997, in Hebel 2004: 227)
Ironically, “the rapid economic development brought by freemarket reforms has … brought a collapse in the country's health
care system. Under-funded hospitals now refuse treatment to the
poor, and medical professionals leave impoverished rural areas.”
(Ramirez, 1 May 2006) Evidently, the benefits accruing to urban
residents are not only denied to rural workers nationally; within
cities urban workers do not have to share their full benefits with
non-legitimate residents. Were benefits shared among all residents,
city resources would be stretched much further, and the overall
prosperity of the legitimate residents would be lower.

Second, these unrecognized rural workers are providing the
cheap labour essential for rapid industrialization. “According to
official statistics, there are now 130 million (equivalent to one-half
the American population) migrant workers in Chinese cities. This
means that China has more migrant than urban workers, and that
they constitute the main Chinese industrial workforce.” (China
Today, April 2004) A survey conducted by China’s labour and
social security department showed that within 2,600 enterprises in
26 Chinese cities, including Beijing, Tianjin and Shenzhen, migrant
workers earn an average wage of 660 yuan per month. This amount
is about 300 yuan lower than the average wage earned by urban
industrial workers. (ibid) As the main component of the urban
13
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work force, the extreme wage discrimination against migrant
workers ensures fast industrial growth at the expense of these
workers.

Third, cheap urban food comes at a severe burden to farmers
in the countryside. “State-imposed price controls and a policy
favouring industrial goods kept the prices of rural produce
artificially low, forcing farmers to subsidize urban living
standards.” (Zweig 1997: 186) Much tax in rural areas has
historically been paid with grain. During the most drastic level of
state procurement, throughout the Great Leap Forward, grain
taxes took crucial food from the rural population and fed both the
urban population and the military, thus contributing to the tragic
poverty and famines of the era. (ibid) While the grain tax has
largely diminished, controlled prices have continued in some form
until today, with some prices still controlled but at close to market
value. When prices were at their lower levels, farmers have been
prevented from making any profit and raising themselves above
the subsistence level. Meanwhile, with rising urban wages and
maintained low food prices, inaccessible urban work was
becoming more profitable. Controlled low food prices directly kept
rural areas from developing as quickly as urban areas.

Fourth, and perhaps most galling to rural workers in recent
times, the historical agricultural taxes, based on size of family and
size of holdings, was collected from subsistence workers and used
to fund urban projects and, indirectly, urban wage workers. This
14
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agricultural tax signified that the rural populations were funding
the government’s urban strategies of development. As the
economy grew, the proceeds from the agricultural tax, as a portion
of the state’s fiscal revenue, dwindled (Lu 2003); however, at the
household level the taxes remained a serious constraint on
incomes, and a constant reminder of the rural workers’ burden
under the state.

Examining the New Emphasis on Rural Development
One of Deng Xiaoping’s strategies was to encourage “natural
development.” Essentially, the naturally advantaged areas such as
the coastal, accessible, and fertile regions should be allowed to
develop quickly rather than adhering to the Maoist model of
centralized planning. (The China Daily, 13 August 2004) A hallmark
of this strategy was the creation of open economic zones along the
coast. This strategy was hugely successful for several years, but
since the 1990s, there have been growing criticisms of the huge
economic disparity between urban and rural populations. Again,
this disparity is problematic both because the rural populations
cannot legitimately move to the cities, and because the rapid
growth of urban economy is achieved at the expense of the
wellbeing of rural areas.

The immediate benefits of the 1978 market reforms lifted up
to 200 million people out of poverty (White Paper PDR I 2005) and
directly benefited rural workers; but by 1993, the rate of
15
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improvement in poverty reduction had slowed down greatly.
(Merkle 2004: 160) The initial success of the Township Village
Enterprises

diminished,

and

rural

unemployment

and

underemployment increased, affecting migration patterns. As
Peter

Nolan

argues,

“The

massive

growth

of

rural

underemployment deeply affects the character of development in
the non-farm sector. It provides intensive incentives for ruralurban migration, and great downward pressure on non-farm
wages in unskilled and low-skilled occupations. By 2002, there
were around 150 million rural residents who worked in the urban
areas without permanent urban residence qualifications.” (Nolan
2004: 13) By the mid-90s, rural residents could choose to embrace a
subsistence livelihood in the countryside or to migrate to the cities
for guaranteed low wages and a risky but relatively better quality
of life.

When the dust of the reform era had settled, the drastic
differences between urban and rural populations spelled trouble
for the nation. As early as 1993 the government was exploring
ways of tackling the rural poverty problem. In 1994 the
government released its National 8-7 Poverty Reduction Plan, with
“8” signifying the remaining 80 million rural poor and “7”
denoting the time span of the project. The three main goals of the
project were listed as follows:
“Socialism will abolish poverty. In order to solve the rural
poverty problem further, narrow the gap between eastern
and western parts of the country, and attain the goal of
16
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common

prosperity,

the

State

Council

decided

to

concentrate manpower, material and financial resources,
and to mobilize forces from all walks of life between 1994
and 2000 in an effort to solve the subsistence problem of 80
million needy people in rural areas throughout the country
within 7 years. This is a daunting battle against a difficult
problem.” (GFKLXB, 1996: 1)1 (Merkle 2004: 161)

Then Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao soon introduced a trial
resettlement policy. In a speech at the Working Conference on
Fighting Poverty, which took place in early June 1999 in Beijing,
Wen stated that there were two types of impoverished people left
in the countryside: “first, disabled and people in need of social
protection (this means people who are dependent on family
support and social welfare) and second, those people who live in
areas with an extremely adverse natural environment, especially in
remote mountainous areas and some of the national minority
regions, where lack of basic productive and living conditions is
common. Some of the people living there have to be moved out
and resettled.” (The People’s Daily, 22 July 1999: 2-3, in Merkle 2004:
162) Such quasi-voluntary resettlement schemes, which took place
primarily in the western provinces of China, did not become the
major poverty reduction strategy of the government.

The most significant measure introduced by 1986 was
regional targeting. This method designated 592 counties, where
the average rural net income was under 500 Renminbi (RMB) per
17
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capita annually, as poverty stricken. “This approach to poverty
reduction—spatially organized to targeted localities—was new in
China’s history and is used both in carrying out public work
programs and in implementing credit programs. Prior to that time,
the main approach was to provide relief goods and grants to
disaster-stricken people through the assistance system.” (Merkle
2004: 167) These regional funding schemes helped provinces and
counties introduce specific projects. In Ningxia province, for
instance, the 336 million RMB that it received from the fund
between 1983 and 1992 helped establish 304 local development
projects. (168) In general, most of the government’s anti-poverty
funding went directly to these designated poor counties. (169)

These programs and strategies, while significant, can be seen
in the context of Jiang Zemin’s emphasis on developing the
western part of China and evening regional disparities. The focus
of President Hu, however, is primarily concerned with rural
development itself. The strategies of the 1980s and 1990s
addressed dire poverty (“food and clothing” poverty) in specific
areas; the new strategies represent a broader understanding of
rural poverty not as an isolated problem of remote or adverse
regions, but as a nationwide problem affecting all aspects of
society. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have backed up this
comprehensive

rural

development

program

with

major

propaganda and funding. They have tried to slow down urban
growth in terms of population growth and investment in public
and private facilities. (The New York Times, 16 August 2006)
18
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One explanation for this policy change is that the former
model

of

industrialization

has

been

exhausted,

and

the

government recognizes the need to redirect growth to the poorer
regions. On the one hand, the potential for agriculture to expand is
severely limited, due to the shortage of cultivable land and falling
prices. On the other hand, the ability of state-owned or collective
enterprises to absorb any more of the rural unskilled labour is also
limited. (Cheng 2004: 133) Thus the state must improve nonagricultural employment opportunities, both through increasing
access to skills and to these jobs, and it must do everything in its
power to protect agriculture and those employed in it to prevent
an employment meltdown.

Questions of the sustainability, intensity, and sincerity of this
new focus have inevitably arisen. The Communist Party seems to
be committed financially to rural development, but for how long
and at what sacrifice remains to be seen. For now the government
will be using many of its land-use fees to support rural investment:
“In recent years, local governments have made a lot of money
charging industry developers land-use fees, but that revenue has
been used mostly for urban construction, and rural areas have
seldom benefited…[now] China will enhance the tax revenue from
land lease or land-use fees and invest it in agriculture and the
countryside.” (Gov.cn, 24 February 2006) The government gives
the impression that it is sincerely committed to tackling rural
poverty and balancing national development. Hu Jintao and Wen
Jiabao have repeatedly emphasized their wishes to improve rural
19
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livelihoods, and they have backed up their words with action.
They openly admit that there are other reasons behind the new
approach: beyond the obvious desire to ease farmers’ burdens,
they are also hoping to avoid the outbreak of collective violence by
improving farmers’ conditions and their perception of the
government. The state has been less forthcoming about whether
this focus on rural development aims to reduce urban migration.
The government could be trying to improve rural areas so that
they will not be forced to abolish the hukou restrictions, a system
designed to prevent full-fledged urban migration. Conversely,
perhaps the government would like to lift the hukou, but it wants
to make sure that the subsequent increase in urban migration will
not be too overwhelming.

One of the most important changes in rural policy has been
the elimination of agricultural taxes on farmers in 2006. These
taxes, based on family size and land holdings, had existed in some
form for almost three millennia: “Since the beginning of recorded
history, all Chinese dynasties from the primeval Shang to the
Communists have relied on often crushing taxes levied on the
peasantry.” (MacNamara, November 2005) As the Chinese finance
minister Jin Renqing publicly announced: “We will completely
rescind the agricultural tax throughout the country, throwing it
into the ‘dustbin of history’ after a history of 2,600 years in China.”
Jin expected the reform of rural taxes and fees to reduce the
financial burden of 800 million rural residents by about $15.63
billion a year. (The Financial Times, 8 March 2006)
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Wen Jiabao originally announced the proposal to phase out
the agricultural tax during the 2004 National People’s Congress
Session, with the plan to eliminate the tax within 5 years. In 2005
he announced at the 10th National People’s Congress that the
government

was

accelerating

the

tax

reduction

process:

“Agricultural tax will be exempted throughout the country next
year, which means what had been targeted for five years will be
achieved in just three years.” (The China Daily, 6 March 2005)
Evidence shows that the agricultural tax probably constituted 25%
of the peasant’s tax burden, with the rest of the burden comprising
local taxes, “contributions” (tiliu) and “apportionments” (tongchou).
(Li 2004: 48-52) Wen’s tax reform addresses these local taxes as
well: “Over 70 billion yuan in the form of ‘three deductions’ (for
public reserve funds, public welfare funds and management fees)
and ‘five charges’ (charges for rural education, family planning,
militia training, rural road construction and subsidies to entitled
groups) would also be eliminated.” (The Financial Times, 8 March
2006) By eliminating the taxes for all rural residents nationwide,
the government has sent a clear message that it is taking a
comprehensive,

rather

than

targeted,

approach

to

rural

development. Furthermore, the message is no longer simply about
food and clothing, but about levelling the urban-rural disparity.

The portion of the agriculture tax as a share in China’s total
fiscal budget was only 1.7% by 2003. (Lu 2003: 392) However, some
analysts worry that the tax elimination will hurt those local
governments heavily dependent on tax revenue to function. The
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elimination of the agricultural tax and similar “contributions” does
not spell the abolition of all taxes for farmers: “Rural residents will
gradually be moved to other tax categories similar to their urban
counterparts.” (The China Daily, 26 December 2005, quoting Yang
Jingyu, chairman of NPC Law Committee) In other words, the
local governments are not fully bereft of tax revenue, but have lost
a major portion of their previous tax revenue which must be
compensated by the government: “Thus, elimination of the
agriculture tax had to be tied to the institution of a centrally
coordinated revenue sharing scheme and to shifts in responsibility
for public service provision to higher levels of government.
Otherwise, there would be no hope of restraining taxation and fees
at the local level.” (Lu 2003: 392) Wen Jiabao was aware of this
problem and had taken steps to address this financial loss:
“Revenue decreases in local budgets incurred as a result of taxes
reduced or exempted on agriculture and livestock will be offset
principally by transfer payments from the central government.”
(The China Daily, 6 March 2005) The government has promised
over 103 billion RMB annually to both ensure normal operation of
township governments and to meet the goal of rural compulsory
education. (The Financial Times, 8 March 2006)

Besides the elimination of agricultural tax, the government
was keen to improve the basic infrastructure for the rural
population. In the 11th Five Year Plan the government allocated
100 billion RMB (US$12.3 billion) for road construction in the
countryside. (Gov.cn, 24 February 2006) Local governments are
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thus able to grant subsidies for village infrastructure. Many
villages which cite poor roads as their major obstacle to
development

pursue

subsidies

in

building

transportation

infrastructure. In Zhangjiamiao Village in Pingqiao Township,
Nanbu County, for example, the residents decided that the
community’s greatest need would be a central road from the
highway into the village. The village group, aided by the Animal
Husbandry Bureau and Heifer International, agreed that each
family would invest 100 yuan plus labour, and solicit the
remainder of necessary funds from the county government. The
county government agreed to the request and provided the rest of
the money on the condition that the villagers invest financially and
contribute their labour to the construction of the road. (Xu
Quanjian, interviewed by the author, 9 July 2006) In Dayi County’s
Qunming Village, which lies across the river from the main
highway, the residents found that the dirt path between the river
and the village isolated the villagers from the market and proved a
danger to the residents. They petitioned for government assistance
to build a concrete path from the river to the village, and
throughout the village as well. The county government granted
the village 20 tons of cement, with the understanding that each
family would invest money and contribute labour to the
construction of the concrete paths. (Zhang Mingxia, interviewed
by the author, 13 July 2006) The villagers now hope to secure
funding for building a bridge across the water in order to increase
access to the main road. (See Picture 1)
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The government has also in the last few years increased its
subsidies to farmers for other infrastructure needs. For example,
the government is increasingly subsidizing bio-gas tanks for
farmers raising livestock. These tanks, which convert animal
manure into gas which may be used for cooking, have multiple
benefits for its owners: the use of gas eliminates the need for
firewood, sparing both the labour and the environmental
consequences of chopping down trees and branches; the remaining
solid residue in the tank is purified of bacteria and much cleaner
(and less odorous) for spreading on the fields and using in
fisheries. The gas may cook all meals in summer and one or two
meals a day in winter; when Zhang Chengbi showed us her biogas system, she bragged, “And best of all [the gas for cooking] is
completely free. In the city you’d have to pay for gas!” (Zhang
Chengbi, interviewed by the author, 7 July 2006) The subsidies for
bio-gas tanks, which can be as much as 1000 yuan for a 1400 yuan
tank, are awarded through a county’s Energy Resource Office;
village heads or groups (such as livestock bureaus or nongovernmental organizations) who apply to this office on behalf of
the villages are put on a waiting list to receive the household
subsidies and the technical construction assistance.

In Pingqiao Township of Nanbu County, the Nanbu County
Animal Husbandry Bureau was able to secure from the County
Magistrate a subsidy of 15 yuan per square meter for new pig barn
construction. (The average cost for building a standardized pig
barn is 125 yuan/m2.) This standardized construction was
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necessary for ensuring hygiene and efficiency, and the subsidy
encouraged pig farmers to invest in building a new barn. In 2006
the government increased its subsidy to 50 yuan/m2, which
resulted in more investment from the Pingqiao farmers. (Long
Baojun, interviewed by the author, 8 July 2006)

Soil erosion is a serious ecological problem troubling the
farmers. In 1999, the government initiated one of the most
ambitious conservation programs in the developing world in order
to prevent soil erosion. (Uchida et al 2004) When completed, the
program should convert around 14.67 million hectares of cropland,
4.4 million of which are to be on cultivated land with a slope of at
least 25 degrees. (World Wildlife Fund 2003) All over China, the
government pays a subsidy to each family for “returning” their
hillside allotments to forest—in other words, for not farming it.
They receive more money for tending the hillside by planting trees
on it and caring for it.2 The Grain to Green Policy is not voluntary;
families are bound to return any land that is hilly enough to meet
the government criteria. For some families in one village in Dayi
County, this amounted to a family’s total allotment of land.
(Zhang Mingxia, interviewed by the author, 13 July 2006) This
policy has been controversial; some families are happy to receive a
subsidy for not farming their land, while others feel that the
subsidy cannot replace the amount of food they would produce on
the returned plot. As one farmer pointed out, “Now all my land is
returned to the government and we have to buy everything. The
subsidy from the government is too little and we have to spend
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money to buy food to survive.” (Huang Hua, interviewed by the
author, 14 July 2006) The immediate consequence is that the policy
pushes farmers further into the cash economy.

Meanwhile, the government is aware of the importance of
providing micro-credit for households and small businesses in
rural areas. According to Wu Xiaoling, Deputy Governor of
Sichuan Province, “First, reform of the rural credit cooperatives
has been underway smoothly and the number of rural households
that have access to micro-credits and joint-guaranteed microcredits from rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) nationwide reached
71.34 million as of the end-September, 2005, accounting for 32.31
percent of the total 220 million rural households.” (Speech, 22
March 2006) By his estimates, the micro-credit provided by the
rural credit cooperatives is meeting 60 per cent of the needs of
China’s 220 million rural households. The 2004 No. 1 document
specifically called on financial institutions to better serve the rural
economy by expanding micro-credit services and joint-guaranteed
loans to farmers. (Wu 2006)

The No. 1 Documents of 2005 and 2006 further stress the
need to foster micro-credit services and expand farmer access to
credit: “The No.1 documents of the central government in [the last]
three consecutive years all [emphasized] encouraging institutional
innovation in rural financial system, while in [the most] recent two
years it clarified that micro-credit should be developed greatly as
an appropriate financial innovation.” (Wu 2006) Because the
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inability of households and small enterprises to access credit has
been a major obstacle to rural entrepreneurship, the government
hopes increasing its financial and credit services to rural residents
will improve livelihoods and increase employment opportunities.

Since privatization haltingly began in the 1990s, the ability of
private companies to establish businesses has reportedly been
difficult, particularly in rural areas. Some local governments set up
barriers to small businesses in the form of land use and official
permits. The central government has taken steps to lower these
barriers, however, as it recognizes the dwindling potential of TVEs
(Town and Village Enterprises) and state-owned enterprises to
offer new employment. “Private firms are expected to be the
engine of rural economic growth in the future. Although the
National People’s Congress revised the constitution to ensure
equal treatment of private enterprises, more needs to be done to
pull down the many barriers to private sector development that
exist at the local level….The government should establish clear
rules of the game and build up rural infrastructure.” (Huang et al
2004: 57) Agriculture-related firms are already benefiting from the
new policies: “As the government is going to increase subsidies for
main grain production areas, agriculture material firms, such as
Shandong Denghai Seeds Co and Nanjing Redsun Co, will be the
largest beneficiaries.” Firms that produce construction materials
and consumption goods for farmers can expect new demand and
create employment opportunities. (Gov.cn, 24 February 2006)
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The

ability

of

private

businesses

to

develop

new

employment opportunities may greatly influence the outward
migration trends and the outcome of the hukou dilemma. It is
against this background that some cities and provinces have
relaxed the hukou restrictions considerably. For instance, in Jiangsu
Province, the differentiation of rural and urban domicile
registration has been abolished, and the urban and rural residents
are treated equally. (China Today, April 2004) Some welfare reforms
have been enacted as well: “In big cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and
Shenzhen, a considerable number of schools for migrant workers'
children have opened. Migrant workers in some areas also have
the legal right to a pension and industrial injury insurance.” (ibid)
Several interviewees mentioned that it became easier to migrate to
the cities. Zhang Weishu explained, “The current policies allow all
the young people to work out. We all like the policies—I quite
agree that the people should be allowed to work out. If the young
people are kept home, it is a waste of resources.” (Zhang Weishu,
interviewed by the author, 11 July 2006)

Despite the official press touting recent reforms, however,
some studies show that the hukou reforms have made little
difference to the most vulnerable migrants: “Official Chinese press
statements

portray

recent

hukou

reforms

as

eliminating

discrimination in the household registration system. Instead, these
reforms have transformed the hukou system from a method of
restricting change in permanent residence to a barrier preventing
some of China’s most vulnerable citizens from receiving public
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services.” (Congressional Executive Commission on China 2005: 1)
Whether the government has plans to further relax the hukou is still
a matter of speculation, but the intense efforts to improve the
welfare of rural residents may be seen as a strategy to reduce the
need for urban migration.

The government is finally addressing what is one of the most
contentious rural issues: land rights. Since the dismantling of the
commune, land has been legally entrusted to the township, which
administers it and ensures that every resident has access to land.
(Oi 1989) The land is divided into residential, farming, and
development zones, and must occasionally be reconfigured.
Disputes arise when the reconfiguring of land infringes on the
rights of users to access land, primarily when developers convince
officials to lease agricultural land to them for real estate
development. Land rights infringements have become a serious
problem since the expansion of cities and the growth of industrial
and housing developments in peri-urban areas. In these urban
expansions and peri-urban developments, the newly developed
land is too often taken from its users without adequate
compensation. This appropriation is possible because land rights
do not belong to the individual users, but rather to the township
and village heads. These local leaders have strong economic
incentives to sell or lease the land to the wealthy developers.
Consequently, the land users are often forced out of the land to
find low-paid non-agricultural work in the city. Of the 87,000
government-recognized collective protests in China in 2005, many
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of them addressed the abuses of land rights. (Bloomberg.com, 3
March 2006)3

These protests, especially when illicitly photographed and
captured on video, deal a damaging blow to the government’s
legitimacy. They reveal the government’s inability to solve the
land rights problem through the judiciary and its failure to address
the poor people’s grievances. To handle these protests, which
increased by 10,000 between 2004 and 2005 alone (Bloomberg.com,
3 March 2006), the government has resorted to several tactics. First,
they are clamping down on media coverage of the protests. But
several protests which turned violent were widely publicized and
greatly embarrassed the government. The government seems to
permit such protests to take place as a kind of “pressure valve” so
that tensions do not escalate into more violent confrontations.

Second, the government is keen to address some of the root
causes of the land rights crisis. It publicly acknowledged the
problem and allowed people to debate the issue. It also punished
those officials who abused land rights for personal gains
(China.org, 27 December 2000; The China Daily, 13 July 2005), and
publicized the new legislations that protected the rights of land
users. (Gov.cn, 11 May 2006) However, the government did
nothing to change the local officials’ absolute control over the land,
the lack of judicial protection of land users’ rights, the illegal
transactions of land between the officials and developers, and the
lack of press freedom to report the problems on the ground. While
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the government has begun to address the land rights issue, it will
likely remain the most contentious rural issue until the deeper
issue of property and judicial rights are thoroughly addressed.

Regarding rural social development, the government has
initiated several complementary programs to improve rural
education. The most important goal is to offer free compulsory
education in all rural areas by 2010. “All the rural students
receiving the nine-year compulsory education (elementary and
junior secondary education) will be exempted from paying
miscellaneous as well as tuition fees by 2010, which is a goal we
put forward in the 11th Five-Year Programme (2006-10)…. Already
36 million rural students are now benefiting from this policy.”
(Gov.cn, 11 November 2005, quoting Han Jin, Director of the
Ministry of Education’s Department of Planning) The new
development strategies of China, which include developing
Chinese talent and education, stress the need for improved rural
education: “[China] will quicken the readjustment of the
educational structure and institute education aimed at all-round
development of students, with emphasis being put on compulsory
education, especially compulsory education in the countryside.”
(White Paper PDR III 2005)

The government has also encouraged teachers to teach in the
countryside for several years in the hope that as more qualified
teachers exchange both knowledge and experience with the
students and local teachers, education will be improved. The
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Ministry of Education spokesman Wang Xuming noted that mere
access to schools would no longer be the main problem in rural
education, as basic school fees for rural children will be abolished
in 2007: “Instead, improving the quality of rural education will
become the focus and is a key to building a new socialist
countryside.” (The China Daily, 8 March 2006, quoting Wang)
Graduates who volunteer for the ministry’s rotation program
could receive a master’s degree after teaching in the countryside
for four years. This program is not only intended to improve rural
education, however; it is also a social policy that encourages urban
residents to acknowledge a social duty to rural populations.

Moreover, improving access to healthcare has become a
priority for the government as the government acknowledges the
medical concerns of rural residents. In 2005, the government
established a new rural cooperative medical system to fund part of
the farmers’ medical expenses. In June 2006, 1400 counties joined
the pilot program, which should be available to 80 per cent of
Chinese counties by the end of 2008. (China View, 11 September
2006) “With the new policy, a farmer puts 10 yuan (US$1.25) a year
into his personal medical care account and the government adds
another 40 yuan (US$5). The government will pay a maximum of
65 per cent of his medical charges a year.” The total allowance
provided by the central government in 2006 should reach 4.23
billion RMB (US$529 million). The government is also planning to
improve rural healthcare facilities: “By 2010, China will renovate
22,000 village clinics, 1,300 county-level general hospitals, 400
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county-level traditional or ethnic hospitals and 950 county-level
maternity and child-care institutes.” (China View, 11 Sept 2006)
Finally, the Ministry of Health is establishing a rotational system
similar to the teaching rotational system, offering incentives to
urban doctors for rural work.

The state has since the 1990s been allowing more nongovernmental groups to form, even though it has maintained
authority over all independent civil society groups. “It is often in
the interests of the state, local government and organization
members that greater autonomy is exercised—to deal with issues
in which the state can no longer afford to be involved, to deal with
conflict, and to further common interests in developing the local
economy.” (Plummer et al 2004: 26) International organizations
such as the Heifer International, the Plan International, as well as
the Chinese groups like Nongjianu (Rural Women) use their
connections, expertise and outside funding to improve the welfare
of rural communities. Rather than seeing the Heifer International
as a competitor, the government integrates certain Heifer strategies
such as community focus, wealth and knowledge sharing, and
equitable development with its agenda of “Establishing the New
Socialist Countryside.” (See Picture 2)

In the midst of its rapid economic growth, China’s
environment has suffered massive deforestation, water and air
pollution, and depletion of resources. According to Pan Yue,
China’s Deputy Minister of the Environment, “Our raw materials
33

Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.1
are scarce, we don’t have enough land, and our population is
constantly growing…Cities are growing, but desert areas are
expanding at the same time; habitable and usable land has been
halved over the past 50 years…[China’s GDP miracle] will end
soon because the environment can no longer keep pace.” (Wen
2005: 10) The dire situation has prompted the government to begin
endorsing a “scientific concept of development,” which promotes
a more efficient use of resources and better protection of the
environment. (Gov.cn, 13 Mar 2006)

Hu Jintao’s focus on balanced growth has had the dual
objectives of protecting the environment and addressing the ruralurban disparities. At a March 2005 meeting on population and the
environment, Hu Jintao declared, “China should speed up the
adjustment of its irrational economic structure and completely
abandon the 'extensive way' of economic growth. China should
promote economic growth based on improvement of quality of the
people, efficient use of resources, environmental pollution
reduction and the importance attached to quality and economic
returns for the building of an energy-efficient and environmentfriendly society.” (The People’s Daily, 13 March 2005) The increasing
emphasis on the environment was apparent in many aspects of our
interviewees’ lives. The Grain to Green policy, the bio-gas
subsidies, and the organic and sustainable farming raised public
awareness of the importance of environmental protection. 4 The
current efforts of the government have reassured many rural
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residents that the government is reversing the harm inflicted on
the environment.

Do the Rural Development Strategies Represent a
Reorientation of Reform?
Given the new and major changes occurring in the countryside,
should the New Socialist Countryside movement be considered a
reversal in the government’s development strategy? Or should it
be seen as no more than a political manoeuvre, however wellintentioned?

The current policies of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao represent a
clear departure from the policies of Mao, Deng and Jiang. Mao,
while exhibiting great empathy with the peasant as the backbone
of the revolution (Mao 1951), openly exploited their food
production and subsistence lifestyle through the collective system.
Deng lifted millions of rural workers out of poverty by disbanding
the communes and creating the household responsibility system,
but his policies benefited the urban areas at the expense of the
countryside. Jiang’s policies, which established regional targeting
through the provision of additional funding for the western part of
China and for the designated poor counties, exclusively targeted
the worst poverty in the country. By comparison, Hu Jintao’s
policy is more inclusive than those of his predecessors. It aims at
evening the urban-rural disparities and accelerating rural
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development. It represents a paradigm shift from rapid growth at
any cost towards more balanced economic growth.

The new emphasis on rural development has significant
implications for China in the twentieth-first century. This strategy
wins strong support from rural workers, development strategists
and public media. It affects the level of rural political support for
the state, the changing patterns of migration, and the people’s
access to land resources. The elimination of agricultural taxes has
won the Communist authorities much goodwill from the rural
population. “Before when there were taxes, maybe some … people
hated the CCP. Now you get subsidy, and it’s wonderful with no
tax. Hu Jintao has really reduced our burden and has really helped
us…This is just like heaven now.” (Zhang Chengbi, interviewed by
the author, 7 July 2006) “After Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao gained
power, they really are concerned about us. They try to do some
good for us and ease our farmers’ burden. They are really good
people! They are supported by over 90% of the farmers.” (Zhang
Weishu, interviewed by the author, 11 July 2006) These remarks
correspond to the positive portrayal of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao
in the media abroad:

“Hu and Wen's pledge to redirect

government spending to basic rural services have helped to build
an image of populist leaders who care about those who have not
benefited from China's economic growth.” (National Public Radio,
19 April 2006) The fact that every dynasty in imperial China was
overthrown by discontented peasants may have played a role in
changing the development policies. “Mao's successors are
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determined to give the countryside a belated helping hand, they
say, if only out of fear of a new peasant uprising.” (BBC News,
November 2005) Since 2004, frequent outbreaks of rural protests
have compelled Hu Jintao to adopt radical measures to improve
his own image and that of the Communist Party. The popular
support for the state will now depend on the successful
implementation of his rural development policies. The ultimate
goal of his policies is to “ease the farmers’ burden” and to improve
social harmony. An immediate consequence is that a drastically
improved rural environment will encourage some migrants to
return home and to work in the local areas, and it may eventually
reverse the rural-urban migration.

In my interviews with three returning migrants who
participated in the Heifer livestock raising programs at their
villages, they spoke of the good quality of life at home. Their
income from the Heifer livestock raising programs was about the
same of what they had earned in the city before. Zhang Anzhong
returned

to

Pingqiao

Township

in

Nanbu

County

from

construction work in a nearby city to raise pigs through Heifer. “I
prefer the fresh air of the countryside, and never aspired to life in
the city. Even though [the construction job] made more money, I
spent more too. I wanted to come back to start my own business.
There is nothing to worry about, even if I lose some money.”
(Zhang Anzhong, interviewed by the author, 7 July 2006) He is
now the local veterinarian in his village. Kong Lingying worked in
a garment factory in Shanghai and returned home to raise rabbits
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with Heifer in Beiyuan Township, Nanbu County. She worked
almost as much as she had in Shanghai but she was more
financially secure and had control over her work schedule. As she
recalled, “The salary is a little better than the city income and I can
take care of my kids at home. I am enjoying a more peaceful and
free (ziyou) life.” (Kong Lingying, interviewed by the author, 10
July 2006) When Chen Suqiong was in the city, she packaged
liquor in a factory and transported sand at a construction site. She
commented on the hardships of being a migrant worker:
“It is difficult, hard work, and you have to be watched; there
is no freedom. If you have worked every day as a migrant
worker then you might get more money than raising rabbits,
but that is hard—usually it is seasonal work, not every day. It
is heavy labor and the living expenses are worse [than here].
If it is scorching hot you still have to work. But here if it is hot
I don’t have to go work; I can stay inside and enjoy the
electric fan. It’s more relaxing here.” (Chen Suqiong,
interviewed by the author, 14 July 2006)

Their stories reveal that as long as there is a better economic
environment in rural areas, many migrant workers prefer to live a
stable life at their home villages rather than enduring all the
hardships in the cities. Chen Suqiong’s father agreed: “Now many
people want to come back to the land because of the agricultural
tax exemption and the government’s subsidy to them for growing
on the land.” (Chen Suqiong’s father, interviewed by the author,
10 July 2006)
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But many interviewees were concerned about their access to
land resources. On average, most villagers in Nanbu and Dayi
counties had an allotment of 0.7 mu of land per person.5 When the
migrant workers returned, there would be a growing pressure on
the limited land resources in overcrowded villages. As Zhang
Weishu stated, “This is the situation in my village: all young
people who are able to go out and work in the city have gone. This
leaves only the old and babies. This means we have excessive land
and excessive food. We worry though that when all the young
people come back we won’t have enough land.” (Zhang Weishu,
interviewed by the author, 11 July 2006) Zhang Anzhong shared
the same view: “You just work out with the person who is leaving
and you negotiate. [The migrant worker] may even ask around
before leaving because he doesn’t want to abandon the land
because it is bad for the soil.” (Zhang Anzhong, interviewed by the
author, 7 July 2006) Where rural labor surpluses don’t exist due to
high migration, substantially improved rural opportunities may
again cause tension over agricultural land.

Conclusion
The Chinese government’s determination to “ease the farmer’s
burden” is a daunting task. But politically, this emphasis on rural
development is a sensible strategy to address the frequent eruption
of protests. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao are trying to prove
themselves as competent as their predecessors Chairman Mao,
Deng Xiaoping and, to a lesser extent, Jiang Zemin.6 Rural unrest
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will not serve them well as they are eager to show the world that
China has become a modernizing and strong world power. From
an economic perspective, the White Paper for 2006 reveals that
China’s development strategy is to rely on domestic demand to
fuel growth. (White Paper 2005 PDR I) A domestic demandoriented policy depends on an increasingly prosperous population.
With up to 900 million farmers, the government’s investment in
their well-being will eventually lead to the rise of their purchasing
power. How long will the New Socialist Countryside Movement
sustain itself? This campaign will continue until rural unrest has
diminished and more balanced growth is achieved. The Chinese
government is determined to provide universal free compulsory
education for all children and access to health care for rural
populations. When the government finally has lifted millions of
poor rural families out of poverty, it may alter the hukou
restrictions without any fear that the peasants may flock to the
cities.

To conclude, the rural development policies implemented by
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao set out to address all the social,
environmental, economic and political problems caused by Deng’s
urban-based development strategies. If Hu and Wen succeed in
accomplishing their goals, China will soon achieve a more
balanced and sustainable economic growth and become a new
model for the developing world.
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Glossary
chengshihua

城市化

dushihua

都市化

Guoji Xiaomuniu Xiangmu

国际小母牛项目

Guowuyuan fupin kaifa lingdao
xiaozu bangongshi

国务院扶贫开发领导小组办公室

hukou

户口

Jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun

建设社会主义新农村

liudong renkou

流动人口

mu

畝

Nongjianu

农家女

tiliu

提留

tongchou

统筹

yuan

元

Zhongguo nongmin diaocha

中国农民调查

ziyou

自由

41

Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.1

Notes
Guowuyuan fupin kaifa lingdao xiaozu bangongshi.
In Qunming Village, Dayi County, for example, the grain to
green subsidy was 210 yuan/mu, with an extra 20 yuan/ mu for
tending the hillside. (Zhang Mingxia, interviewed by the author,
13 July 2006)
3 The inability of the media to cover these protests means that the
causes and nature of the protest is not always known. However,
many protestors have managed to smuggle out photos, videos, or
descriptions of the protests, and many rurally based protests focus
on land rights abuses or local authorities’ abuses. (National Public
Radio, 13 December 2005)
4 One village in Dayi is experiencing a closure of the local coal
mine because of the mine owners’ extensive pollution violations.
The river running through this township in Dayi County was
entirely black and may never be safe for drinking or even
swimming. Though the mine employed most of our interviewees,
the closure was deemed necessary due to its constant harm to the
environment and regular violations of safety codes. This single
experience seems to back up the promises in the media that the
government would crack down on environmental abuses by
companies.
5 This allotment was based on family size during the land
redistribution of 1978-1983. Changes in family size due to birth
and deaths rarely affected the family’s allotment of land. Several
families expressed frustration that though they had gained
daughters-in-law and children/ grandchildren, they had not
gained any more land. Indeed, several villagers needed their
children to move to the city so that the family could take over their
allotment and have enough land to farm. This finding confirms the
view of Elisabeth Croll that land allocation anomalies resulting
from marriage, birth, and death was common in Henan Province
as early as 1987, four years after the end of land redistribution.
(Croll 1994: 36-94)
6 Informal conversations during fieldwork revealed that a number
of Chinese people feel that Jiang Zemin was more concerned with
the military build-up of the country rather than the everyday
problems of rural Chinese. Even when expressing avid admiration
for Hu Jintao, many people spoke with great cynicism about Jiang.
1
2
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Appendices
Figure 1: National Population of Those Rural People Who Have
Left Their Original Home or Household Registration

全国按现住地，户口登记地分的人口(乡村)
合计

Total

30,949,572

本县(市)
其他乡

本县(市)
其他镇

本县(市)
其他街道

3,844,891

6,004,998

987,504

[Moved to
a] village in
original
county/
city

[Moved to
a] town in
original
county/
city

[Moved to a]
street
committee in
original
county/ city

本市区
其他乡

[Moved
to a]
village in
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urban
district
503,051

本市区
其他镇

[Moved
to a]
town in
original
urban
district
676,462

本市区
其他街道

[Moved to
a] street
committee
in original
urban
district
1,032,690

本省其他县 ( 市 ) 省外
市区
[Moved to a]
different county
or urban district
in original
province

[Moved]
Outside the
province

7,091,561

10,808,415

While almost 11 million of the 2000 rural migrant population had moved
outside their province, over 13 million rural migrants stayed within their
county, city, or urban district.

Source: Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the People’s

Republic of China (中国 2000 年人口普查资料), 726. 2002. Compiled
By Population Census Office (PCO).
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Figure 2: Growing Intercounty Floating Population of China,
1982-2000
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Source: Liang & Ma, 2004: 471, citing PCO 1985: Table 2, p.559;
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Division of Socio- demographics, National Bureau of Statistics.
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Figure 3: Gini Index (Percentages):
China's Inequality Compared to 10 Other Countries.

China's level of inequality is surpassed only by notoriously
unequal countries such as Brazil and Guatemala, which have
experienced many more centuries of uneven development than
China.
Sources: Heilig 2006; Data from the World Bank (2005) and the
China Statistical Yearbook, 2004, Table 3-11.
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Picture 1: Dayi County Bridge
This “Bridge” from the main road to Qunming village results in
deaths during most rainy seasons, when villagers must detour
several hours to get to the main road or risk a trip through high
water. Many villagers mentioned their hope to secure funding for
a bridge as other villages downriver and up-river have obtained.

Photograph by Jessica Wade
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Picture 2: Integrating NGOs and the Government
Propaganda.
This sign in Dayi County reads: “The Badi Grass Exercise [The
grass known for rapidly spreading over large areas of land]:
Establishing the New Socialist Countryside: A Heifer International
Rabbit Raising Project.”

Photograph by Jessica Wade
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Interviews in Nanbu and Dayi Counties in Sichuan Province
Chen Suqiong (陈素琼), 44-year-old female living in Tuanshang
Village, Xieyuan Township, Dayi County. Rabbit raiser with
Heifer. Interviewed by the author on 14 July 2006.
Huang Hua (黄华), 26-year-old female living in Qunming Village,
Xieyuan Township, Dayi County. Rabbit raiser with Heifer.
Interviewed by the author on 14 July 2006.
Kong Lingying (孔令英), 35-year-old female living in Beiyuan
Township, Nanbu County. Rabbit raiser with Heifer.
Interviewed by the author on 10 July 2006.
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Long Baojun ( 龙 宝 君 ), mid-30s male, Animal Husbandry
Technician, Nanbu County Animal Husbandry Bureau.
Interviewed by the author on 8 July 2006.
Tang Mibu (唐密布), 24-year-old female living in Qunming Village,
Xieyuan Township, Nanbu County. Rabbit raiser with Heifer.
Interviewed by the author on 14 July 2006.
Xu Quanjian (徐全健), mid-50s male, Director, Nanbu County
Animal Husbandry Bureau. Heifer project implementer,
Nanbu County. Interviewed by the author on 9 July 2006.
Zhang Anzhong (张安忠), 24-year-old male living in Pingqiao
Township, Nanbu County. Pig-breeder and trainee with
Heifer for local veterinarian. Interviewed by the author on 7
July 2006.
Zhang Chengbi (张成壁), 60-year-old female living in Pingqiao
Township,

Nanbu

County.

Farmer

and

pig-breeder.

Interviewed by the author on 7 July 2006.
Zhang Mingxia (张明霞), 34-year-old female living in Qunming
Village,

Xieyuan

Township,

Dayi

County.

Farmer,

rabbit-raiser, group leader (Group 12, Qunming Village), and
community

representative

for

Heifer

International.

Interviewed by the author on 13 July 2006.
Zhang Weishu ( 张 维 树 ), mid-60s male living in Pingqiao
Township,

Nanbu

County.

Farmer

Interviewed by the author on 11 July 2006.
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